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Introduction
Medical language understanding aims at extracting the information content of medical texts, in the form of a structured representation of their contents. This representation may take the appearance of information formats lled with expressions of the text 1], or of a conceptual representation that is farther away from the initial wording 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . It then constitutes the basis for information or knowledge manipulation tasks, such as, e.g., information retrieval, coding, or quality assurance (e.g., 1, 5] ). The understanding process itself increasingly relies on a body of domain knowledge, generally expressed in the same conceptual formalism. A basic problem is to express this knowledge in a formal representation suitable for a computational exploitation. We examine in this paper issues in the design of a conceptual representation for medical natural language understanding. We focus on the fundamental part of a conceptual representation: its ontology.
A pervasive issue is the potential confusion between the computational meaning of symbols and their human interpretation. Humans tend to overload symbols with the meanings their natural language counterparts have. They may be tempted to invest the program with the same understanding capabilities as they have, whereas they rely on human interpretation capacities to get this meaning. This confusion is misleading, for it may lead us to expect too much of the program: drawing inferences based on meaning is di erent from drawing inferences based on computational form.
We rst set the general framework in which we address these issues (section 2). In that section, we discuss brie y the opposition between computational content and human interpretation. In the following section (section 3), we describe at the symbol level the characteristics of the formalism we use that are relevant for its interpretation at the knowledge level. These are the choices that condition the human interpretation of the computational representations. We then propose principles, to be used at the knowledge level, that help a knowledge engineer to declare knowledge in such a way that its intended meaning agrees with its computational use (section 4). Formal choices are further justi ed in the light of these principles (section 5). We then brie y discuss the general structure of our ontology and knowledge acquisition assignments in its design (section 6).
We illustrate these problems with examples drawn from our experience with Menelas, a medical language understanding project 7].
Natural Language vs Formal Language
We address the problem of providing a computer program with human knowledge in order to perform a given task. The key issue is whether a piece of knowledge usable by a computer and a piece of human knowledge are identical, or belong to two di erent kinds. Knowledge itself can only be characterized by its manifestation: essentially, its expression in a language. We can thus try to type knowledge according to the language in which it is expressed: formal language or natural language.
Formal languages are based on a generative syntax, and their expressions are manipulated only according to their \syntactic" properties. From a computational point of view, conceptual representations are instructions that direct the execution of a program. Their content is de ned at the so-called \symbol level," or \program level " 8] .
In contrast, natural languages are not formal: their syntax is not generative (formal linguistic theories indeed are; but they are approximations of natural language). Expressions in natural language need an interpretation to be used. The content of natural language representations is de ned at the \knowledge level " 8] .
One cannot express the same content in these two languages. In particular, the same string of symbols, taken as the expression of a piece of knowledge in natural language, will not produce the same set of entailments as if it were taken as the expression of a piece of knowledge in a formal language.
The human knowledge that we want to provide the program is not formal: there is no formal theory for modeling common-sense knowledge or empirical medical knowledge. The only operational expression of this knowledge is natural language, and is therefore of the interpreted kind.
Nevertheless, the conceptual representation of this human knowledge must be described in a formal language that relies on uninterpreted symbols. This is necessary if we want it to be usable by a computer.
The goal of the knowledge acquisition task is to obtain a formal representation of human knowledge that a computer can use in conformance with its meaning at the knowledge level. A condition of success in this task is to enable the use of the same representation both as a computational instruction and as an interpreted piece of human knowledge, while still keeping a clear distinction between the two.
However, when considering this representation, e.g., during knowledge acquisition, human actors are naturally inclined to interpret it at the knowledge level, with the natural language understanding faculty. They tend to see a word (interpreted symbol) where there is in fact an instruction (uninterpreted symbol). Of course, a well trained knowledge engineer will ght this tendency: s/he will keep a clear division between (i) language or linguistic descriptions and (ii) formal, conceptual representations. 2 Problems however arise at the interface. We have on the one hand a linguistic system, in which humans can verbalize their knowledge, and on the other hand a formal system, that can direct the actions of programs. These systems must be made compatible if we want the program to use the speci ed knowledge in the desired way.
More realistically, we can only expect the conceptual representation to approximate this knowledge. So we must try to obtain the best possible correspondence between the computer use of conceptual symbols and their human interpretation. This paper aims at proposing tentative principles to obtain this correspondence during the knowledge acquisition process. These principles have been elaborated during our work on Menelas. In this context, we used a conceptual representation formalism to represent knowledge to analyze patient discharge summaries in the domain of coronary diseases.
Many formalisms have been proposed for representing conceptual information or knowledge; to cite but a few, Semantic Networks 9], Conceptual Dependency 10], Description
Languages 11], Conceptual Graphs 12, 13] . Most of these formalisms assume a set of concept types and a set of relation types. Concept nodes, linked with relations, are used to form networks representing conceptual structures.
In Menelas, we use the Conceptual Graph formalism. Conceptual Graphs have been used by a number of authors for processing medical language and representing medical concepts 14, 4, 5, 15] . However, most of the issues discussed here have counterparts in the other conceptual formalisms.
Formalism for Ontology Design
An ontology may be de ned as the set of \objects" that exist in the domain considered. These objects encompass as di erent things as concrete objects, properties, values, actions, abstract objects, etc: i.e., everything we can think of. These objects are usually described as concepts or relations between concepts.
Therefore, most conceptual formalisms build on a set of concept types and on a set of relation types. These sets may be ordered to form a taxonomy of concepts or relations. In the Conceptual Graph (CG) formalism, this knowledge is encoded in the support:
The Concept Type Lattice (CTL) describes all concept types that may be used in the concept tokens of conceptual graph representations. Sowa 12] proposes a lattice structure for concept types. Relations too are ordered as a tree 12] or even as a lattice 16]. We restrict ourselves to the consideration of a Relation Tree (RT), since this is the choice made in Menelas. In the rest of the paper, we use alternatively the terms \support" and \ontology": the former is the Conceptual Graph implementation of the latter. In the formal framework de ned by the support, we examine now two additional constraints that we found relevant for the knowledge representation task: a tree-structured subsumption hierarchy (3.1) and the necessity of coupling concepts and relations (3.3) ; the choice between concepts and relations seems quasi-neutral for knowledge representation (3.2).
Tree vs Lattice
Many knowledge representation formalisms allow a concept type to have several fathers in the concept hierarchy, which is then more complex than a tree: it becomes a directed acyclic graph (DAG). This feature is often called \multiple inheritance." For instance, the sum of the UMLS semantic type hierarchy 17] (with the is-a relation) and Metathesaurus (with the has semantic type relation) constitutes a DAG-structured ontology, since metathesaurus concepts may have several semantic types; the MED 18] also has a DAG structure. concept type pairs have absurd as their greatest lower bounds, we have the equivalent of a tree structure again.) This property is important for the \join" operation that combines conceptual representations by merging nodes from di erent CGs. Joining two concepts yields a concept whose type is the greatest lower bound of their two types. If we want this basic join operation to be deterministic, a unique maximal common subtype must exist for any two concept types. A lattice imposes more constraints than a simple, DAG-based, multiple inheritance scheme. The notion of always existing, unique greatest lower bound implies that multiple fathers cannot be scattered randomly on the taxonomy. Let us assume for instance that we have concept types heart component and anatomical cavity, and that we want to say that atrium is a subtype of both of them; we also want to say this of ventricle ( gure 1a). But we end up with having two greatest lower bounds for heart component and anatomical cavity. A method for redressing the concept type structure consists in creating an intermediate type, say heart cavity, which will subsume both atrium and ventricle and be the unique maximal common subtype of heart component and anatomical cavity ( gure 1b). To get a lattice, as is necessary for the support to have good computational properties, requires therefore a careful design of the ontology.
The above-de ned \UMLS ontology" is a DAG, but not a lattice: since several metathesaurus concepts may share the same set of disjoint semantic types, these semantic types have several \maximal" common subtypes. The UMLS may not therefore be used directly to constitute the concept type lattice of a CG-based representation 19].
In most formalisms, all primitive concept types must by de nition be expressed in the concept type hierarchy. Additional types may often also be created dynamically by type de nition: this is a fundamental mechanism in description languages 11, 20] . Type de nition is also possible in the CG formalism, using a conceptual graph to precise the speci c features of the new type. For instance, one could say that a myocardial infarction is a speci c type of infarction, localized in the myocardium:
This entails that myocardial infarction is-a infarction. However, type de nition can only re ne one concept type: therefore, a de ned type may never have two fathers; it may never be the greatest lower bound of two concept types.
As a consequence, all concept types with two fathers must be primitive types: they must be de ned explicitly in the CTL. This imposes a strong completeness constraint on the expression of the CTL. If we say for instance that there is an anatomical cavity type and an organ component type, then either there are things that are both instances of anatomical cavity and organ component, and we must insert the appropriate organ cavity component as their common subtype in the CTL; or we do not insert any common subtype, and concepts of type anatomical cavity and concepts of type organ component will never be joinable: we shall not be able trivially to refer to something both as one and as the other.
To avoid this completeness constraint, we restrict the lattice to a tree structure (actually, a tree transformed into a lattice by adding the absurd type as the common subtype of all leaves, thus enabling the CG machinery to work properly). This choice is further justi ed in section 5 on the basis of semantic considerations. It does not restrict the expressive power of the formalism, since it only keeps a clear separation between the basic ontological types (the support) and encyclopedic knowledge attached to them (in the form of conceptual graphs).
Concept vs Relation
Besides the notion of concept type, Conceptual Graphs, as most other formalisms, use the notion of relation; this notion may also be called link (in semantic networks), slot (in frame languages) or role (in description languages). It may also be used to implement the notions of property or feature. Through relation contraction, we can switch from G 1 to G 2 ; relation expansion lets us move the other way round. As indicated in 12], one could use only a minimal set of relations and represent those needed as concept types (or de ne them from concept types; on the model of the above example, two relations link1 and link2 would be enough to enable the de nition of any binary relation from a corresponding concept type). Furthermore, a di erence in the use of concepts and relations is that the former may have referents, whereas the latter cannot. Also, concepts may bear as many relations as desired, whereas relations only link their relata (we do not consider a notion of metarelation, which does not exist in the standard CG model). For instance, with the above representations, one can refer to the causation event, and make it precise with additional manner or time relations. This is not possible with a causes relation.
On these grounds, one could choose to represent nearly all relational notions as concept types in the CTL, e.g., under a generic relational concept type. However, we think it preferable for clarity and perspicuity to keep relational notions represented as relation types when the attached restrictions (no referent, no \meta-relation") are not a problem. This also keeps graph representations smaller, as can be seen on the above example. Note too that whatever their representation, one needs to represent a large number of relational notions. In Menelas, more than one hundred relation types have been included in the relation hierarchy.
As a conclusion, the formal distinction between concept and relation types does not replicate directly the distinction between semantic concepts and relations at the knowledge level. However, for reasons of ease of representation, a close mapping is more convenient.
Linking Concepts and Relations: Relation Signatures
To give cohesion to the support, we need to couple the concept hierarchy and the relation hierarchy. A minimal coupling takes the form of constraints on the allowable types for the concepts that can be linked with each relation: the relation signatures. For instance, we may specify that relation agent must link actions to humans with the signature graph
In 12], relation signatures are part of the catalog of canonical graphs. Relation signatures are a counterpart of role restrictions in description languages 11]. The signature of a relation de nes its basic semantics with respect to concept types. It is of prime importance for several reasons. From a formal point of view, pending such a constraint, the CG processor would consider concepts and relations somewhat as belonging to two independent, non-communicating worlds, although they are used together to build conceptual graphs. Relation signatures express minimal well-formedness conditions on conceptual graphs. From a human, knowledge engineer point of view, relation signatures serve as a guide to choose the right relation for the right conceptual representation.
In section 2, we have insisted on the distinction between language and concepts. Relation signatures deal with conceptual representation. Therefore, the meaning of a relation should not be confused with the meaning of the relation label, considered as a natural language expression. For instance, the usage of relations in the UMLS semantic network 17] is close to the natural language meanings of their labels. Taking relation a ects as an example, one nds out that it can link many disjoint UMLS semantic types: Acquired Abnormality, Behavior, Biologic Function, ..., Food, ... Research Activity as domain, and Organism, Physiologic Function, Mental Process, Organism Attribute, Group... as range. If we try to grasp the general, formal usage of this relation, by assigning it a signature, we end up with T]-->(affects)--> T] (where T is the top type of the CTL). Similar observations have been made when trying to use this knowledge with a description language 21]. This natural language orientation again is not really surprising though, given that the UMLS captures the semantics of biomedical terminology 22] more than the conceptualization of the underlying knowledge. This corresponds to a di erent emphasis on main goals: indexing and information retrieval vs knowledge representation and reasoning. 9/21 The use of a formalism that a program can easily apply (at the symbol level) for reasoning imposes more rigid usage constraints on relations. Moreover, their semantics are then easier to master (at the knowledge level) for a knowledge engineer. The interpretation that a human reader gives to a relation must be constrained by interpretative rules to adhere to the formal constraints imposed by its signature. 4 Guidelines for Knowledge Description in the Design of an Ontology
We have examined formalism choices at the symbol level: tree rather than lattice or DAG structure for the subsumption hierarchy and constraining relation signatures. We shall now propose principles that help a knowledge engineer satisfy the constraints induced by these choices. Since these principles are used by a human, they must be expressed and applied at the knowledge level. They constitute interpretative guides for the knowledge engineer. These principles concern the knowledge level interpretation of the hierarchical link (4.1) and the structure built with this link (4.2).
Unique Interpretation for the Hierarchical Link
The CG formalism caters for a unique taxonomic relation: the is-a relation. From an extensional point of view, A is-a B means that the set of occurrences of A is a subset of the set of occurrences of B. For instance, we may say that aorta is-a artery.
When asked to describe taxonomic knowledge, \experts" sometimes interpret the hierarchical relation as a general means of classifying concepts, and read it as A is below B; this notion encompasses more relations than is-a, typically, part-of relations. When trying to assign a place for concept type atrium, a natural move is to put it below heart | as one can nd in MeSH 23] . (Note though that MeSH does not work at the level of concepts, but of natural language expressions; it does not make the restrictive hypothesis of a unique hierarchical relation that we are discussing here.) However, this would mean that the atrium is a kind of heart, which is indeed wrong. Rather, we may say, for instance, that atrium is-a anatomical cavity. The subsumption link proposed by the formalism must hence be interpreted by only one semantic relation at the knowledge level: either is-a or part-of. The other one, e.g., part-of, may be de ned separately and ordered in the relation hierarchy. In the CG formalism, conceptual graphs built from the support may then be used to describe partof knowledge, with basic, generic graphs such as atrium]-->(part-of)--> heart]. This avoids the problematic mix up of hierarchical links in the concept hierarchy. 3 
Principles of Structural Organization
We propose here principles that help structure concepts in the ontology. These principles have a double reading. When adding concepts to the ontology, they help decide where to insert these concepts. When using the ontology, they help constrain the knowledge level interpretation of the concept symbols. The latter are de ned at the symbol level and used by the program according to their tree structure. Given a type and its immediate subtypes in the concept hierarchy, we know that each subtype is more speci c than the type. However, knowing this is not su cient to build an ontology. More precise principles for deciding whether to support a given decomposition of a type into subtypes would be of great help in the design of the concept hierarchy. In the reverse direction, respecting such guidelines also helps to read the contents of the ontology. As explained in section 2, we must strive to obtain the best possible correspondence between the computational properties induced by the structure of the knowledge representation and the properties that human interpretation assigns to this knowledge. In the absence of precise guidelines, humans may load concepts and their structure with more meaning than is formally de ned to the system. A focal point for examining these issues is the local system composed of a father and its children, that we shall call a local tree ( gure 2). By stating principles applicable to every local tree, we can act on the whole hierarchy. Each principle must be easily understandable and applicable by knowledge engineers, so that it guide them in knowledge acquisition. And most important, there must exist a good match between the human interpretation of the principle, taken as a guideline, and the formal use of the representations obtained by following this principle.
We now examine the principles that we are currently tentatively applying in the construction of the Menelas CTL. These principles are formulated as relations that must hold between concept types in a local tree. Each principle is accompanied by a description task: during knowledge acquisition, the person that decides to give a type a new child | the \knowledge engineer" | must justify this decision by describing how this new child satis es the principles. This justi cation is provided in natural language. Doing this exercise forces the knowledge engineer to check that each principle is veri ed, by verbalizing the formal relationships that hold between this new type and its neighbors.
In addition, this verbalization provides documentation on the new type, which is useful in several respects. The documentation indeed helps the maintenance of the ontology, when the knowledge engineer updates the type hierarchy and needs to understand why a given decision has been made. It is also necessary if several persons have to work on the ontology (see section 6.2). More generally, the documentation should help to understand the actual meaning of each concept type more precisely than the rst level of understanding resulting from the interpretation of its label. A simple user interface, KMT (a Knowledge Management Tool), helps to enter concepts types, relations and documentation (as well as relation signatures and additional knowledge), and to navigate through the concept and relation hierarchies.
The rst two principles are a common reference for taxonomies in, e.g., arti cial intelligence or terminology. They express Aristotle's genus and di erentia mode of de nition (see, e.g., 12, p. 106]), and deal with the relations between a father and a child. P1: Similarity Principle | A child must share the type (genus) of its father. This is the basic meaning of the is-a link, that we have discussed in section 4.1. At the level of the whole local tree, this also means that all children share a common meaning. Description: During knowledge acquisition, each time a type is given a new child, the similarities between the child and its father must be explicited. Example: Type mental state is a subtype of state. Type state consists in a description of the world; e.g., it may be true or false. A state asserts something about objects in the world. A mental state states something about a more speci c, mental object.
P2: Speci city Principle | A child must have a speci c di erence that distinguishes
it from its father. This speci es a direction for the is-a link. Description: The speci c di erence of the child. This often takes the form of a distinctive property that the child bears, or (e.g., for actions) of a speci c thematic role always associated to the child. Example: There are three kinds of objects in the CTL: ideal, physical, and mental objects. The speci c di erence of mental state relatively to state is that it involves mental objects.
The third principle further characterizes the relations between siblings.
P3: Opposition Principle | Siblings are organized in a system of oppositions. Each child of a type is opposed to the other children of the same type. This enforces a tree structure. Description: The di erence between a child and each of its siblings. Example: Keeping the same example again, the di erence between mental state and, e.g., physical state, is that it involves a mental object instead of a physical object.
The Opposition Principle is imported from structural linguistics 25, 26] , where the meaning of a term consists in the di erences it has with others. Roughly speaking, to express something, we choose a linguistic realization and, as a consequence, discard the others. The meaning of the selected term comes from the fact that we invest this term with something speci c that other terms do not have. In this sense, language is a system of di erences, and so is knowledge expressed by this medium.
In a similar way, a formal system such as the concept hierarchy constitutes a system of di erences: formally, a concept type acquires its meaning from its position with respect to other concept types. We aim at modeling the linguistic system of di erences with this formal system of di erences.
P4: Unique Semantic Axis Principle | In order to satisfy the Speci city and Opposition Principles together, one can simply constrain all subtypes of a given concept type to di er from their father on a common dimension or axis, each subtype having an exclusive value for this dimension. Description: The chosen semantic axis. Example: The decomposition of state is performed according to the kind of object involved: this is the semantic axis for the specialization of state. The three kinds of objects in the CTL: ideal, physical, and mental objects give rise to three subtypes of state: ideal state, physical state, and mental state.
The Unique Semantic Axis Principle seems to be the best way to enforce the two preceding principles. In a domain such as medicine, it may even be the only method 27]. It must be used as a constraining principle to nalize knowledge structuring.
We do believe all four principles are necessary, but not su cient. For instance, we have not found principles to select relevant axes for specializing a concept type. Also, these principles are generally more constraining or selective that constructive. They are particularly useful when trying to reuse an existing ontology such as the UMLS 19] and adapt it to this knowledge representation framework.
Tree vs Lattice Revisited
The most heterodox choice defended in this paper is the necessity to restrict the ontology structure to a tree. We reexamine this thesis in the light of the previous section. The basic claim made here is that the very contents of the above principles not only lead to a tree structure, as needed according to our formalism choices (section 3) but, more importantly, best respect the nature of knowledge. In section 3, we chose a tree structure on the grounds of formal constraints: lower complexity, less completeness constraints. The fact that one can propose principles at the knowledge level that allow to organize knowledge as a tree (section 4) is not a fortuitous property of our domain, but an essential property of knowledge.
The knowledge we are interested in is not a chaotic set of unconstrained linguistic expressions, as a specialist might freely express them, but an ordered, normalized set of semantic contents. These contents are ordered inasmuch as they re ect the domain theory that the specialist wants to provide. This corresponds to an ontology based on essence (necessary and su cient conditions for object categorization). The uniqueness of the essence of an object leads to the uniqueness of its ascendency, hence to a tree. The applicability of this point to medicine is further discussed in 27].
In the rest of this section, we examine examples showing the advantage of relying on the notion of essence to organize the ontology. Classifying a concept type under another relies on the existence in the child of a speci c property that its father does not include. In conformity with the above discussion, as much as possible, only properties pertaining to the essence of the notion represented should be considered here. For instance, a drug is an object made of a biochemical molecule that is used for its therapeutic or biochemical function.
The essence of a drug in our ontology is not its function, but its being an arti cial, countable physical object (that we label commercial drug). As a result, drugs are not classi ed according to their functions, as is often the case ( gure 3a). Functions are themselves hierarchically organized in another part of the ontology, as are biochemical molecules: we have concept types commercial drug (aspegic, diafusor), biochemical molecule (aspirin, amiodarone), biochemical function (lipid lowering function, beta blocking function), therapeutic function (anticoagulant function, vasodilatator function), etc. ( gure 3b). The complete representation of a drug is an encyclopedic piece of knowledge built from these ontological bricks. It is represented as a conceptual graph which combines these concepts with appropriate relations:
In a similar way, the notion of risk factor will not be represented as a concept type ( gure 4a): being a risk factor is not an essential property of, e.g., a health condition.
Moreover, it is a relative notion: some health condition may be a risk factor for disease A but not for disease B. In fact, risk factor is better considered as a role played by a range of concept types rather than a concept type in itself. If we decided to have a concept type risk factor, we could want to represent that, in our domain, \Diabetes is a risk factor" by an is-a link between diabetes and risk factor ( gure 4b). This would be inaccurate for the reason just cited: this would not explicit what it is a risk factor of. Such notions are generally better considered as relational notions, and represented as relations. So we shall have relations for is risk factor of, fct (function), and the like ( gure 4b).
This approach suppresses the need for most cases of multiple inheritance: we do not need to say both that diabetes is-a disease and diabetes is-a risk factor; neither do we need to put aspirin at the same time below anti in ammatory drug, anticoagulant drug, etc. These formerly multiple fathers now belong to another subtree of the concept type hierarchy, and instead of multiple is-a links in the concept type hierarchy, we now have multiple is risk factor of or fct relations in conceptual graphs:
Notice that we can still perform useful classi cations among drugs. The full, generative power of conceptual graphs complements the essential knowledge contained in the support. For instance, the notion of an anticoagulant drug will be represented as the graph
literally, \a drug made of a molecule whose function is the anticoagulant function." The knowledge base will contain graphs, such as the one for aspegic above, to specify the various functions of each drug. Through the operation of CG projection, which underlies graph subsumption, we can then nd all drugs with an anticoagulant function. Any combination of basic relations in a graph can in fact provide the basis for additional classi cations. Therefore, subsumption links that would be found in a DAG-structured taxonomy are here taken out of the basic ontology. They can be found instead in the generative, graph component of the knowledge base. No functionality is lost. On the contrary, the hierarchy should gain in simplicity, and many new classifying combinations can be considered according to one's needs. This allows to consider knowledge elements from multiple points of view, according to the concept type taken as entry point in the knowledge base. For instance, the physician will be able to look at the different therapeutic classes by entering through the therapeutic function concept, whereas the pharmacologist may want to access biochemical molecules and functions through the corresponding concepts. In each case, the conceptual graph mechanisms give dynamic access to the desired groupings. This powerful, generative capacity relies on the use of a tree-structured ontology based on essential properties. 6 Building the Ontology
Layers in the Ontology
When we say that we use the Conceptual Graph formalism, this has a number of implications: the form of concepts and relations, the way graphs may be built, and so forth. However, this only de nes a general framework for knowledge representation: before we can describe terminal, domain knowledge, providing contents to this framework, more precise representational choices still need to be performed. These choices result in a new framework in which the knowledge description task may be reconsidered. As we shall see by examining an outline of the structure of concept types in the Menelas CTL, several such steps need to be taken. They de ne layers of knowledge, each of which addresses di erent issues and levels of representation. Each such layer may be considered as de ning a more re ned conceptual framework for the next layers, and as providing contents to the previous ones.
1. A rst level in a conceptual structuring often merely deals with the speci cation of a slightly more precise knowledge representation formalism. In Menelas, we use the common notion of object { attribute { value triple. We thus classify concept types accordingly: substratum, attribute and value, at the very top of the CTL. We also specify attr and val relation types in the Relation Tree, and their signatures:
Attributes include notions such as age, sex, arterial pressure, localization, and values include high, low, male, female, right, left, etc. Attributes and values are considered as ancillary types for which a more detailed representation is hardly needed. In contrast, substratum is meant to be the rst class representation for more complex notions. As explained in section 3.2, we could also decide to add a fourth branch for relational concepts. 2. At a very general level, below substratum, we wish to di erentiate, e.g., concept types that have referents in the world from concept types that are taken for themselves, as ideal objects. Numbers are typical examples: each use of number 2 refers to the same instance or referent of type 2. 3. At a still fairly general level, we separate entities that are situated in time (action and state) from entities that are situated in space (concrete object, animate and inanimate, mass and countable), and from time and space notions. Again, appropriate relations (time stamp, duration) and signatures are de ned. 4. At a generic, medical level, we introduce notions of procedure, examination and treatment, health condition, sign and disease, function, patient, doctor, discipline, anatomical structure, organ, vessel, anatomical region, drug, etc. 5. At the speci c, medical level, we enumerate the procedures, signs, diseases, functions, organs, etc., that are useful in our domain.
These layers draw on very di erent competences. For instance, layer 1 will need some background in knowledge representation formalisms; layer 4 calls on a medical semantics competence; and layer 5 requires a good knowledge of medicine and of the target specialty. Looking again at the UMLS, we can assign its semantic network mainly to layer 4, with a layer 3 top, whereas the Metathesaurus mostly deals with layer 5. In order to be feasible, the task of knowledge acquisition requires the right competence and the preceding representation layer; we return to this point in section 6.2. Notions at a given level are de ned according to their essence. For instance, the essence of an action is to have a goal and an agent: it is an intentional notion, as opposed to unintentional notions such as physical process. This essence enables us to de ne the essential properties of its children: it provides the conceptual framework for de ning them. For instance, an examination is an intentional action whose purpose is to obtain information on the state of the patient. Examination is de ned by specializing the essential characteristic of what is an action, i.e., its intentional character. An improper de nition for examination would be, e.g., an action that uses a measuring instrument, although it would probably cover the same set of actual occurrences. The is-a hierarchy is intensional rather than extensional 27].
In summary, choosing and implementing a knowledge representation framework is a recurring issue in the design of the ontology. Each knowledge representation level facilitates the description of the next level.
Each knowledge representation level also provides an adequate locus for handling speci c representation, inference or natural language mapping problems. For instance, the generic medical layer (4) is the place where general knowledge about diagnosis and therapy can be stated. The action, state, object, time and space layer (3) helps the mapping with semantic notions of natural languages. It is also the right level for expressing temporal reasoning knowledge.
Knowledge Acquisition: Who does What?
The person who provides knowledge for a knowledge-based system in a given domain is often referred to as \the expert." This assumes that all you need to build a knowledge base is a person who has expertise in the task of the system. This person may be helped or guided by another one, trained in knowledge representation, referred to as \the knowledge engineer." However, as we have seen in section 6.1, even when only considering the ontology, many kinds of expertises are needed to design and acquire the needed layers of conceptual knowledge structuring. Persons with all (or most of) these skills are indeed very rare, and the construction of the ontology is better seen as a collaboration of people with di erent expertises. Let us review the competences that are needed, taking as a guide the layered organization described in section 6.1.
A rst step in knowledge base design is the choice of the knowledge representation formalism (here, Conceptual Graphs). This requires a competence in arti cial intelligence, and more speci cally in knowledge representation and knowledge-based systems. Given the natural language understanding task of the kind of system we are considering, a background in natural language processing is also useful.
The formal level of the ontology is actually a re nement of the knowledge represen-tation formalism. In the case of the Menelas ontology, we implemented an object { attribute { value scheme within the CG formalism. The same people should therefore work on that part of the design. The higher (upper non-medical) level of the ontology deals with epistemological, philosophical ontological knowledge. It requires a completely di erent kind of competence, which is itself distinct from the one needed at the next level.
The general (other non-medical) level of the ontology is meant to help the mapping with semantic notions of natural languages. It also describes general, common-sense notions. A background in semantics is desirable here. Everyone has common-sense knowledge; however, experience in the representation of common-sense notions will be useful.
The generic, biomedical layer structures the fundamental notions of medicine. It requires a competence in medical semantics and epistemology.
Finally, the speci c medical part of the ontology needs expertise in the relevant medical domain. Generally, however, the medical specialist will be assisted by a knowledge engineer, who alleviates for a lack of training in representing notions in a formal system.
Providing knowledge for a given layer also necessitates a good understanding of the framework set for knowledge representation at that level by the previous layer. For this reason, the person working at one level of the ontology either needs some minimal competence in the previous level, or some help from someone who has this competence, e.g., the person who has designed the previous level.
As a consequence, unless the \expert" mentioned above possesses a very wide range of competences, s/he must be considered as only one of the numerous \experts" who participate in the design of the knowledge base. And even as such, s/he will generally need to be assisted by some of the other experts. This may seem awkward, since the domain \expert" can perform the task that is expected of the knowledge-based system, and can be considered as making use of comparable knowledge. However, as is well known, knowing how to use knowledge does not entail knowing how to model the knowledge one uses. This is true of the problem-solving knowledge on which knowledge-based systems focus; this seems even more evident in the description of the ontology.
Conclusion
The basic issue addressed by this paper concerns the gap between knowledge and its formal representation: we must ensure that the computer uses a knowledge representation in conformance with its meaning. The way the knowledge engineer reads the representation, i.e., at the knowledge level, must be as close as possible to its formal exploitation by the program. Reciprocally, the formal exploitation must be as close as possible to the intended meaning of the representation.
We have proposed principles that help to obtain such a match. To design and read knowledge representations, the knowledge engineer must follow our so-called interpretative principles, in order to constrain his/her natural interpretative tendency. These principles attempt to model the structure of knowledge, independently of the target formalism. They must re ect the very nature of knowledge as expressed in the language in which it is actually used. As a consequence, they bring justi cations to the choices made at the symbol level, including our basic claim that the subsumption hierarchy must be a tree rather than a lattice.
These principles derive both from theory and practice. In particular, they are currently used and tested in the design of the Menelas ontology. This ontology contains over one thousand concept types and one hundred relation types. It is used for declaring the knowledge needed both for a semantic lexicon and the pragmatic level of analysis. Building such knowledge components has shown evidence for the usefulness of these principles.
